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WEST VIRGINIA'S NEW SUMMARY EVICTION
PROCEEDINGS: NEW QUESTIONS FOR AN OLD ANSWER
BRUCE G. PERRONE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1983 the West Virginia Legislature enacted a summary eviction law entitled
"Remedies for Wrongful Occupation of Residential Rental Property."' Setting out
the type of summary process adopted by most states in the 19th century, the new
statute appears at first to be another of the familiar American statutory proceedings
for possession of property-an old answer to the perceived problem of landlordtenant possessory disputes. Instead, it has numerous differences and its own set
of problems.
First, there are the problems stemming from unartful drafting: inconsistency
or unclarity within the statue, no apparent consideration of the right to jury trial,
no apparent consideration of the statute's interaction with the Rules of Civil Procedure, and failure to specify the preclusive effect of the new proceeding. Moreover,
the statute is beset by constitutional problems. The first such problem stems from
inappropriate notice to defendants of the consequences of the default judgment
procedures. The second problem originates from the entire notion of summary
process in a legal world of enhanced substantive and procedural rights.
After reviewing the historical development and background of proceedings for
possession of real property,2 this Article will discuss the provisions of the West
Virginia summary relief statute3 and the problems of drafting.' Thereafter, the due
5
process problems of the statute will be examined.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A review of eight centuries of Anglo-American law on the question of regaining possession of real property from another shows that the more things change,
the more things stay the same. Over and over again an existing procedure for regaining possessions becomes too costly or cumbersome, and a faster, easier method
is developed.
The first remedy for regaining possession of land was, obviously, self-help.
The earliest known state of the English law permitted one entitled to possession
* Director, North Central West Virginia Legal Aid Society; B.A. Davidson College, 1975; J.D.
Washington & Lee University, 1978. The author was co-counsel in Criss v. Salvation Army Residences,
Inc., 319 S.E.2d 403 (W. Va. 1984), which is discussed later in this Article.
W.VA. CODE §§ 55-3A-1 to 3 (Supp. 1984).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 6-19.
See infra text accompanying notes 20-40. Hereinafter the term, summary relief statute, will
refer only to West Virginia Code §§ 55-3A-1 to 3 (Supp. 1984). General terms, such as summary eviction laws or summary proceedings statutes, will refer to a general category of similar laws.
I See infra text accompanying notes 41-74.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 75-106.
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of land to enter and to use whatever force was necessary or appropriate to recover
the land.6 But by 1381 such "forcible entry," even by one entitled to land, was
made a criminal offense. 7 Succeeding statutes provided civil remedies to the forcibly
dispossessed complainant.' Thus, the first method of regaining possession of land
became restricted and subject to possible legal liability.
In the place of self-help the English common law created what are known as
the old real actions, to be brought by one who alleged he was entitled to possession.'
These forms of action were the first in which the power of the realm was invoked
to recover possession. By using them, the property owner could protect himself
from liability for either forcible or otherwise wrongful entry. As time went on,
though, these forms of action grew extremely formalistic with intricate requirements
of pleading and practice. By the sixteenth century these real actions became so
complex and time-consuming that they passed into disuse.'"
In the place of the real actions arose the action of ejectment." Developing
out of the action of trespass, ejectment was used by either freeholders or lessees
to legally reclaim possession of property. The principle feature of the ejectment
action was that the plaintiff had to prove his title to the disputed land.' 2 The plain6

E. COHEN, PROPERTY 211 (1978). See also 0.

BROWDER,

R.

CUNNINGHAM

& J.

JULIN,

BASIC

PROPERTY LAW 352 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BASIC PROPERTY LAW]; Barnett, When the Landlord
Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law in Florida, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 238, 244
& n.24 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Barnett].
5 Rich. II, stat. 1, ch. 7 (1381), cited in Barnett, supra note 6, at 245.
See Barnett, supra note 6, at 245-46. Subsequent statutes (1) commanded the justice to go
to the place and jail the offender, 15 Rich. II, ch. 2 (1391), (2) provided a civil remedy to restore
possession and allowed treble damages for forcible entry or forcible detainer after peaceable entry,
8 Hen. VI, ch. 9 (1429), (3) provided that legal action must be brought within three years of the forcible
act, 31 Eliz. I, ch. 11 (1588), and (4) made the action available to both freeholders and tenants for
years, 21 Jac. I, ch. 15 (1623). Collectively, these statutes are known as the Forcible Entry Acts. Barnett,
supra note 6, at 245-46.

' See C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT
AND THE INSTITUTION 60-64 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DONAHUE, KAUPER & MARTIN]. See also 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 76 (2d ed. 1899); A. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW

34-43 (1961); J.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

LAWLER

& G.

LAWLER,

A

SHORT HISTORICAL

152-159 (1940).

The "real actions" included: (1) the Assize of Novel Disseisin, to be brought by the person
who claimed he had been seised of the land but had been recently dispossessed, (2) the Assize of Mort
D'Ancestor, to be brought by the rightful heir of the land when the occupant had entered after the
seised ancestor's death and before the plaintiff, the rightful heir, had entered, (3) the Writ of Right,
which tried the ultimate question of who, as between the plaintiff and defendant, had a better right
to the land, and (4) the Write of Entry, in which the plaintiff alleged a specific defect in the title of
defendant, the occupant, and that he, the plaintiff, had better title as a result of the defect. DONAHUE,
KAUPER & MARTIN, supra at 61-62.
0 DONAHUE, KAUPER & MARTIN, supra note 9, at 63.
Id. at 64-65. The common law action of ejectment was incorporated into the statutes of most
American states. See, e.g., W.VA. CODE § 55-4-1 (1981).
"2This is true in West Virginia. West Virginia Code § 55-4-1 provides that the action of ejectment
"may be brought in the same cases in which a writ of right might have been brought" prior to July
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tiff had to prove that his claim to the land was superior not only to that of the
possessor of the land, but also to that of anyone else in the world. This meant
in the plaintiff's
that an ejectment defendant could prevail by showing a defect
3
title regardless of the defendant's own title or lack of title.1
So long as ejectment actions were primarily conflicting claims of title, namely,
the right to permanent possession, ejectment was a satisfactory alternative. However,
as the relation of landlord-tenant grew in frequency and variety of uses, the action
of ejectment became increasingly unsuitable. Proof of title was time-consuming
and expensive, too much so, to handle quickly the tenant who had not paid rent
or who had held over beyond the term. Moreover, allowing a tenant to prevail
when the landlord's title was defective seemed a patently unjust result.'
The response to these problems was the creation of statutory proceedings for
the recovery of possession of real property. These proceedings were designed to
be fast, easy, and inexpensive and, thus, were preferred by landlords over selfhelp. These "summary proceedings" were developed in the eighteenth century, and
today every American state has a statutory version."s The statutes originally were
intended to address only landlord-tenant disputes. Many states, however, have joined
them with provisions prohibiting forcible entry or holding of land and thus have
written the statutes in terms broad enough to encompass both landlord-tenant relations and other types of possessory disputes.'" Typically, these statutes are called
unlawful detainer or forcible entry and detainer laws.
1, 1850 in Virginia. Thus, as a general rule, the plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength
of his own title and cannot rely on the weakness of the title of the defendant. Jones v. Chesapeake
& Ohio R.R. Co., 14 W. Va. 514, 524 (1878).
,1 See Olinger v. Shepard, 11 Va. 644, 667-68, 12 Gratt. 462, 471 (1855) (stating that "the defendant, without having any right to possession himself, may generally prevent a recovery by the plaintiff,
by showing an outstanding right of possession in another."); Wade v. McDougle, 59 W. Va. 113, 115,
52 S.E. 1026, 1027 (1906). Hence the cliche "possession is nine-tenths of the law."
14

See 2 H. TIFANY, REAL

PROPERTY.

§§ 272,

278-86 (1910); 3A G. THoMPSON, COMMENTARIES

1370, at 719 (1959); BASIc PROPERTY LAW, supra note
6, at 353-54; Note, Landlord and Tenant, 25 VAND. L. REv. 654 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Landlord and Tenant]. The problem of proving title, itself a difficult process at that time, was eventually eliminated from landlord-tenant ejectment cases. The courts developed the doctrine that a tenant
was estopped from denying the title of the one through whom the tenant claimed right to the premises,
that is, his landlord. See, e.g., Voss v. King, 33 W. Va. 236, 239-41, 10 S.E. 402, 402-03 (1889) (stating
the English common-law basis of the West Virginia doctrine).
11Note, Landlord and Tenant, supra note 14, at 655 n.12. See, e.g., Unlawful Entry or Detainer
ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §

Act, W.VA. CODE §§ 55-3-1 to -6 (1981).
16 See BAs Ic PROPERTY LAW, supra note 6, at 354.

At this point two distinctions should be kept in mind. First, it is important to differentiate the
term "forcible" from the broader term "unlawful." Forcible acts are always unlawful; peaceable acts
may not be, depending on the legal right of the actor. As stated in the preceding text accompanying
notes 12 & 13, forcible acts have been discouraged even when the actor is legally entitled to possession.
Thus, forcible acts of entry or detainer are unlawful, regardless of who commits them. Peaceable entry
or detainer by one legally entitled to possession, however, is not unlawful. Peaceable entry or detainer
is unlawful only when committed by one not entitled to possession. The second distinction is between
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In general, these laws shared three characteristics. First, they were fast, often
providing a defendant only a few days to respond to the suit. ' Second, the grounds
upon which the statute could be invoked by the landlord were very limited. Usually

only nonpayment of rent or expiration of the term were sufficient grounds for invoking the statute." Third, the defenses that could be asserted by a tenant were
similarly limited. Usually only a simple factual denial of the allegations could be
asserted as a defense.' 9
III.

PROVISIONS OF THE WEST VIRGIIA. SUMMARY RELIEF STATUTE

Prior to 1983 West Virginia landlords had three separate statutory proceedings available to recover possession of real property: ejectment, 20 unlawful
detainer procedures in circuit court,2' and unlawful detainer procedures in magistrate
entry and detainer (or holding of possession). The usual landlord-tenant problem is an issue of detainer.
Because entry was concededly lawful under the lease agreement, the issue is whether the tenant is holding
over after expiration, that is, breach of condition, default of rent, and so on.
" For example, the Oregon law upheld in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), provided a
defendant two to six days between the serving of the complaint and trial, unless the defendant filed
a continuance bond in the amount of accruing rent. Similarly, the Kansas summary proceeding law
provides that trial should be had within eight days after the answer date, which is itself only three
days after the service date. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-2306, -2308 (1983). See Comment, ForcibleEntry
and DetainerActions in Kansas: Some Observationson Lindsey v. Normet, 21 KAN. L. REv. 71 (1972).
Additionally, the Alaska statute allows "not less than 2 nor more than 4 days" between service of
the summons and the date of trial, ALASKA R. Civ. P. 85(a)(2); ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.120. See Clocksin,
Alaska's Summary Eviction-A Confused Anachronism, 4 U.C.L.A. [UCLA]-AtAsKA L. REv. 56, 59
n.11 (1974).
" See, e.g., Note, Landlord-TenantLaw: Plotting the Death of a Summary ProceedingStatute-A
Test for Ripeness, 25 U. FIA. L. REv. 220, 222 n.23 (1972). For slightly broader laws see, e.g., N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711 (McKinney 1963) (addressing default in rent and holding over, plus adjudication as a bankrupt, and use of premises as a "bawdy house"); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A-5714
(Callaghan 1977) (addressing default in rent and holding over, plus causing health hazard, forcible entry or detainer, and holding possession after sale by mortgage, execution, or estate).
,1 The primary reason that defenses could be so limited was the common-law doctrine of
independence of covenants. According to doctrine, the tenant's covenant to pay rent was not dependent
upon any other promise or covenant of the landowner, so that the tenant could not raise defenses
to nonpayment arising out of defective conditions or other such allegations. In essence, "[the rent
was deemed to issue from the land itself 'without reference to the condition of the buildings or structures upon it."' Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 118 (,V. Va. 1978) (quoting Hart v. Windsor, 52
Eng. Rep. 1114, 1119 (1843)). Thus, the only defenses to alleged nonpayment of rent, for example,
were basically failure of the landowner to deliver possession and proof by the tenant of payment.
20 W. VA. CODE §§ 55-4-1 to -31a (1981 & Supp. 1984).
21 Id. §§ 55-3-1 to -6 (1981). The terms of West Virginia Code § 55-3-3, dealing with the time
to respond, are substantially the same as its predecessors dating back to the Virginia Code of 1849.
The language therein provides that the summons "shall be made returnable not more than ninety days
after its date and shall be served at least ten days before the return date thereof." W. VA. CODE §
55-3-3 (1981). Thus, the return date under old practice could have been only ten days after service
and as much as ninety days after service. See Wheeling Gas Co. v. Wheeling, 7 W. Va. 22 (1873)
(dealing with the longest time in which the summons may be returnable); Superior v. Peters, 94 W.
Va. 376, 118 S.E. 540 (1923) (holding that the unlawful detainer action may be tried in the same term
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the Remedies
court.2 2 However, in 1983 the legislature added to these proceedings
23

for Wrongful Occupation of Residential Rental Property Act.

Under the new statute, a landlord seeking to remove a tenant may apply to
either circuit court or magistrate court. In the application or complaint, the landlord

must: (1) state that he has the right to recover possessions, (2) describe the property,
(3) state the grounds upon which the right is based, and (4) set forth a "prayer
for possession of the property."2 " If one follows the maxim of statutory construction that "the expression of one thing excludes the other,"2 " apparently the landlord

may only seek possession of the property and not a judgment for past due rent.2

There are three grounds for invocation of the new summary relief statute: arrears
in rent, deliberate or negligent damage to property, and that the tenant "has breached
a warranty or a leasehold covenant." 2' 7 Concerning these grounds two points must
be noted. First, the traditional ground of holding over after expiration of the term
is not listed as a ground to invoke this summary procedure. Second, the phrase
warranty or leasehold covenant seems extremely broad and is not defined in the
statute. If this phrase includes all of the myriad terms included by lessors in typical
residential leases, then the legislature has extended summary proceedings to circumstances far wider than traditionally accepted. Whether the phrase, warranty
of court in which it was brought).
This language has not been updated for modern practice under the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure. In the author's experience, actions for unlawful detainer in circuit courts are treated the
same as other civil actions. Thus, a defendant has twenty days if served personally or thirty days if
served by substituted process in which to file an answer. See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
22

W. VA. CODE §§ 50-2-1, 50-4-5 (1981).

W. VA. CODE §§ 55-3A-1 to -3 (Supp. 1984). As originally introduced in the House of Delegates,
the legislative predecessor of the new statute would have provided simply that a landlord was allowed
to seek possession from a tenant by a written notice after nonpayment of rent or breach of condition
and that, if the tenant did not then vacate, the landlord could go to magistrate court for relief. The
stated purpose of this original version was "to allow a landlord to evict a tenant for failure to pay
rent or for breach of a warranty or leasehold covenant... without first seeking recourse in the courts."
H.R. 1209, Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1983).
This original version was changed completely in the House Judiciary Committee. With only a
few differences from the final enacted version, the Committee substitute for H.R. 1209 passed the
House. A significant change was made on the floor of the Senate to delete the following language
from § 55-3A-l(c):
in the case of a claim for arrearage in rent, that defenses to the claim for rent may not
be heard unless the tenant at the time of hearing pays into a court a current rental payment
which is due and that the court may, if it deems it in the interest of justice to do so, require
the tenant to pay into court all or part of the claimed arrearages. ...
J. SENATE W. VA. 1863 (1983). By the same motion similar language was also struck from § 55-3A-3(b).
See infra note 34.
24 W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-l(a).
21 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See, e.g., Douglas v. Koontz, 137 W. Va. 345, 361, 71
"

S.E.2d 319, 328 (1952).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 69-72.
2W
W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-l(a)(3) (Supp. 1984).
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or leasehold covenant, would include the traditional ground of holding over after
expiration might depend upon the wording of the lease.
To assure speediness in these new proceedings, a trial date is scheduled before
the petition is even filed or served. The landlord-petitioner goes to the court to
request a hearing date, which "shall be not less than five nor more than ten judicial
days following such request." 2 8 Immediately thereafter the petitioner must serve
a notice of the hearing date upon the tenant. Service of the notice may be made
either under the normal provisions of rule 4 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure or by certified mail, return receipt requested. 29 The notice must inform
the tenant that any defenses must be submitted within five days of receipt of the
notice but "in no case later than the fifth day next preceding the date of the
hearing. '"30 Finally, upon receiving proof of service, the petitioner must file his
3
petition and proof of service. '
In response to the petition the tenant may assert "any and all defenses" which
might be raised in ejectment or unlawful detainer actions.32 However, if the tenant
has not appeared, answered, or filed some other responsive pleading, the court is
3
required to enter a default judgment awarding possession to the petitioner. If
34
the tenant files an answer, then the court proceeds to a hearing. Continuances

2$Id. § 55-3A-l(b).
21 Id. § 55-3A-1(c).
30

Id.

3 Id.
32

Id. § 55-3A-2.

33 Id. § 55-3A-3(a).
34 Id. § 55-3A-3(c). As they now appear in the West Virginia Code, subsections 55-3A-3(b) and

3(c) seem redundant. Both provide that the court shall proceed to a hearing if the tenant responds
either to "a petition alleging arrearage in rent" or to "a petition alleging breach by the tenant or damage
to the property." The explanation i& that as originally proposed § 55-3A-3(b) contained additional provisions requiring a tenant to pay the amount of arrearage into court before being heard on the defense
of breach of a material covenant by the landlord. Such a requirement was not included for petitions
on other grounds. This language was deleted on the floor of the Senate. See supra note 23.
A quirk in the wording of subsections (b) and (c) of § 55-3A-3 is that they do not provide for
a hearing or final order in all contested situations. Pursuant to § 55-3A-3(e), the court shall issue final
orders at the conclusion of hearings conducted in accordance with subsections (b) and (c). However,
subsections (b) and (c)do not provide for hearings in all landlord-tenant disputes. Subsection (c) is
general and provides that where the defendant "files an answer raising defenses" to petitions alleging
either breach by the tenant or damage to the property, the court shall proceed to hearing. This covers
all possibilities arising from two of three grounds' a landlord may allege. Subsection (b) addresses the
third ground of arrearage in rent but provides for a hearing only if the tenant raises "the defense
of breach by the landlord of a material covenant upon which the duty to pay rent depends." Thus,
read literally the statute does not provide for either a hearing or final order in a rent arrearage case
where the tenant defends bi, alleging payment or retaliatory eviction.
Clearly, the legislature did not intend to exclude hearings or final orders in the above situations.
Nevertheless, there is no statutory language authorizing them. Pragmatically speaking, though, it is
scarcely conceivable that a court would refuse to hold a hearing or to enter a final order based on
this inadvertent exclusion. In summarizing the new statute, the West Virginia court has already stated
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/8
this common sense understanding: "If no answer is filed by the tenant, the court enters an order granting 6
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of the hearing may be granted only for cause, 35 and if the tenant obtains a continuance, he3 6must pay into court any periodic rent that comes due during the
continuance.
If the court finds the tenant to be in wrongful occupation it shall "enter an
order granting immediate possession" to the petitioner. 37 The term immediate, in
this context may not actually mean immediate because the court may consider "the
nature of the property (that is, furnished or unfurnished) the possibility of relative
harm to the parties and other material facts deemed relevant by the court" in setting the time by which the tenant must take leave of the property.38 The order
granting possession must also state that if the tenant does not vacate by the ordered
day, the sheriff shall forthwith remove him.3 9 However, this provision is unclear
as to whether the landlord must return to court and obtain a writ of execution
to remove the tenant who failed to vacate by the ordered date.
The last provision of the new statute, subsection 3(g), is written in a confusing
way. It is most easily understood by reading it in reverse order, that is, last phrase
first and so on. Subsection 3(g) provides as follows:
Absent an issue of title, retaliation, or breach of warranty, and in the event of
an appeal wherein the tenant prevails, if the terms of the lease has expired the
relief ordered by the appellate court shall be for monetary damages only and shall
not restore the tenant to possession. During the pendency of any such appeal no
tenant shall be entitled to remain in possession of the leasehold if the period of
the tenancy has otherwise expired."
First of all, the provision clearly authorizes appeal by a losing tenant. However,
if the period of the tenancy has otherwise expired-presumably other than by the
act alleged in the petition-then no tenant shall be entitled to remain in possession
of the leasehold during the pendancy of any such appeal. The necessary implication from this provision is that the tenant is entitled to remain on the premises
during the appeal so long as the term of the tenancy has not expired. However,
pursuant to this same subsection, if the tenant is removed during the appeal because
the term of the lease has expired, but subsequently prevails in the appeal, the
appellate court can only award monetary damages and cannot restore the tenant
to possession. An exception to this rule is made where the case contains "an issue
of title, retaliation, or breach of warranty." If there is such an issue and the tenant
prevails on appeal, the tenant evidently may win both monetary damages and restoration of possession.
possession of the property to the petitioner. If the tenant raises a defense to the petition a hearing
is held." Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, Inc., 319 S.E.2d 403 OV. Va. 1984).
W
W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-3(d) (Supp. 1984). In other types of cases in magistrate courts each
party is entitled to one continuance "of right" regardless of cause. Id. § 50-5-2 (1980).
36

Id. § 55-3A-3(d) (Supp. 1984).

Id. § 55-3A-3(e).
38Id. § 55-3A-3(f).
31

39 Id.
40 Id. § 55-3A-3(g).
Disseminated
by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985
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The foregoing discussion has outlined the summary relief statute as it is written
and intended to function. There are, however, numerous problems raised by the
statute.
IV.

A.

PROBLEMS OF DRAFTING

Time Periods and Service of Process

The first difficulty lies in determining the exact time period guaranteed a defendant, within which he may file an answer. The statute provides that the tenant
must submit any defenses in writing "within five days of the receipt by the tenant
of the notice, and in no case later than the fifth day next preceding the hearing." 4 '
The first phrase of this language provides no minimum time guarantee to the defendant. Quite the opposite, it provides only that a defendant may not take more
than five days to answer. If this first phrase were all that the statute contained
on this question, then one would assume that a defendant is entitled to as much
as, but no more than, five days. That assumption, though, is voided by the second
phrase, which explicitly states that in no case may a defendant answer later than
five days before the hearing.
The net effect of these two phrases is that the time a defendant has to answer
is not fixed but depends entirely upon the date on which service is received. If
service of the notice of hearing is not received by the defendant until four days
or less before the hearing, the defendant is deprived of the due process right to
a meaningful opportunity' 2 to present defenses if the in no case language were applied
literally. In such a case, good cause presumably would be shown for a continuance
under West Virginia Code section 55-3A-3(d). 3
Left undefined in the statute is the minimum amount of time required by the
Constitution, within which the defendant must submit his defense. Unfortunately,
the legislature has provided no guidance as to what would be an appropriate
minimum. On this matter defendants are left to the varying discretion of judges
and magistrates. This problem is not merely an academic quibble. It is likely to
arise frequently because of the interplay of three portions of the statute.
First, the hearing must be fixed "not less than five nor more than ten judicial
days" following the petitioner's request." This is a range of only seven to fourteen
calendar days.4 5 Second, the statute eliminates the five days prior to hearing as
a time to respond,' 4 so that the time range within which the defendant must answer
Id. § 55-3A-I(c) (emphasis added).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
,3 W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-3(d) (Supp. 1984).
" Id. § 55-3A-I(b).
" This calculation assumes that Saturdays are not "judicial days" even though many magistrate
courts are open for some transactions on Saturday mornings.
" W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-I(c) (Supp. 1984).
"

2
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is reduced to only two to nine calendar days. 47 Third, service of the notice of hearing may not be prompt. Under the statute the petitioner may serve the notice either
by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by any method provided by rule 4
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure."8 Service by certified mail would
take a minimum of one day and frequently more than that. Personal service through
the sheriff in most circumstances would be likely to take more than one day. Finally,
substituted service by posting, which now requires two attempts at personal service
plus certified mail, return receipt requested, 49 would be likely to take more than
one day. Thus each of these common methods of service reduce the time allowed
the defendant to respond.
The result is that, pursuant to the provisions of the statute, a defendant often
may have less than five days to respond. It is, as of yet, unclear how much less
than five days would constitute "good cause" for continuance or for how long
a continuance must be granted.
B. Right to Jury
Unlike the unlawful detainer statute,"0 the summary relief statute contains no
provision granting any right to trial by jury and does not even provide an off-hand
indication as to whether a jury trial was contemplated by the legislature. However,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently held, in Criss v. Salvation
Army Residences, Inc.," that "either party in an action brought under W. Va. Code
55-3A-1 et seq. [1983] may demand a jury trial. ' 52 Guided by the 1974 decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Pernell v. Southall Realty, 3 the West Virginia
court held that the state constitution's guarantee of the right to trial by jury54 reserved
the right to jury trial in summary eviction proceedings.
In Criss, the court stated that right to jury trial cases turn not on whether
the modern civil action is identical to a common law action but on whether the
modern action "involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in
41 If the five days preceding the date of hearing were construed to be "judicial days" also, the
time range would be constricted still further. If a landlord were to argue that the legislature intended
by this section to assure the petitioner a minimum period of notice of the defendant's response, such
a construction would then be in accord with rule 6(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation."
48

W. VA. CODE

§

55-3A-l(c) (Supp. 1984).

See State ex rel. Thomas v. Neal, 299 S.E.2d 23, 25 (W. Va. 1982).
10W. VA. CODE § 55-3-3 (1981).
41

5' Criss, 319 S.E.2d 403.

Id. at 404 (syllabus point 1).
416 U.S. 363 (1974).
84 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13 (preserving the right to jury trial "in suits at common law, where
the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars"). The seventh amendment of the United States Constitution is substantially identical to article III, § 13 of the West Virginia Constitution.
'2

:3
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an action at law, rather than an action in equity.""5 The court then summarized
the Pernell decision as holding the following:
[S]ummary eviction proceedings though different in detail from the common law
action of ejectment, which was an action at law not in equity, serve the same essential function-to permit a plaintiff to evict one who is wrongfully detaining possession and to regain possession himself ....
[B]ecause the right to recover possession
of real property was a right ascertained and protected by courts at common law,
the right is also protected by the Seventh Amendment. 6

The same analysis applies under the West Virginia Constitution, and the right to
trial by jury is preserved in actions brought under the summary relief statute.
While holding that a jury trial was available even if it would slow the intended
summary process 5 7 the court nevertheless recognized the concern that if all tenants
exercised a right to jury trial, the purpose of the statute would be thwarted. The
court suggested that such a result was unlikely because the right to jury trial was
limited by the trial court's power to grant summary judgment:
In the average landlord-tenant dispute where the failure to pay rent is the ground
for removal of a tenant there will be no substantial defenses asserted by the tenant.
Once the failure to pay rent is established there will be no genuine issues of material
fact and the court will have the power to grant summary judgment, correctly finding
that the party is not entitled to a jury trial."

In this manner the court attempted to steer a middle course of recognizing the
right to jury trial while also recognizing the intent of summary proceedings and
the ways in which the right to jury trial may be limited.

51 Criss,
36

319 S.E.2d at 406.

Id. at 406-07.

On this point the court quoted the Supreme Court in Pernell
"Some delay, of course, is inherent in any fair-minded system of justice. A landlordtenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be resolved with due process of law unless
both parties have had a fair opportunity to present their cases. Our courts were never intended
to serve as rubber stamps for landlords seeking to evict their tenants, but rather to see that
justice be done before a man is evicted from him home."
Criss, 319 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385 (1974)).
Although the Pernell decision stated in 1974 that "[o]ur courts were never intended to serve as
rubber stamps for landlords," the reality is that the courts have sometimes been just that. In 1974
an observer from the United Kingdom noted the following:
The chief characteristic of [American] summary proceedings is, as the name implies, their
summariness. There is nothing quite so depressing for one's sense of the majesty of the law
than to sit through a morning session of an American metropolitan landlord-tenant court
and watch the judge issue seventy-five judgments in as many minutes.
Note, Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MODERN L. REV. 242, 244 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Change in the American Law].
11 Criss, 319 S.E.2d at 407.
"
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Rules of Civil Procedure

In the same way that the legislature provided no guidance on the jury trial
issue, so also did it not indicate whether the summary eviction proceedings were
to be within the scope of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules).
On the one hand rule 1 states that, unless specifically provided otherwise, civil actions
are governed by the Rules." On the other hand, the time limitations in the statute
are much shorter than those provided in the Rules and, thus, might exclude many
of the devices contained in the Rules if applied without exception. Here, also, the
West Virginia court has steered a middle course.
In Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, Inc., the tenants filed a counterclaim
for damages stemming from the landlord's alleged retaliatory conduct and sought
discovery in the form of interrogatories and a request to produce documents. The
trial court, however, dismissed the counterclaim and denied discovery. 60 On appeal
the West Virginia high court characterized the issue as depending upon whether
6
the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to statutory summary eviction proceedings. '
The court noted that rule 81 did not limit the applicability of the Rules either in
the summary proceedings or in "unlawful detainer actions, of which the case sub
judice is merely an expedited version." ' 62 The court held the Rules applicable,
63
"[having] no directive to the contrary from the Legislature."
The Criss decision did not, however, say that the time periods of the summary
relief statute were overridden by those set forth in the Rules. Instead, to the extent
that there might be inconsistency, "the summary statute governs." 6 Counterclaims
65
must be filed within the time limits provided for filing of defenses to the petition.
Parties have a right to obtain discovery "if they can do so in the ten days pre-

" Rule 1 provides in part as follows: "These rules govern the procedure in all trial courts of
record in all actions, suits or other judicial proceedings of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases

at law or in equity, with the qualifications and exceptions stated in Rule 81." W. VA. R. Civ. P. 1.
None of the exceptions or limitations of rule 81 apply to these summary proceedings. Criss, 319 S.E.2d
at 408.
60 In a letter to counsel the trial court stated only that " '[a] close reading of West Virginia Code
55-3A-1, et seq, along with my understanding of the legislative history behind same, lead [sic] me to
the conclusion that this legislation does not contemplate jury trials, counterclaims or discovery.' " Criss,
319 S.E.2d at 406 n.4.

I Id. at 408.
62Id.
64

Id.
Id.

6,

See W. VA.

63

CODE

§ 55-3A-1(c) (Supp. 1984).

The court has issued an opinion in one other case arising from § 55-3A-1, but the summary
nature played no role in the decision. See West Virginia ex reL Strickland v. Daniels, No. 16212 (W.
Va. July 12, 1984).
In a footnote in Strickland, the court stated, as decided in Criss, that counterclaims were allowed
within the summary proceeding timeframe. Strickland, No. 16212, slip op. at 7 n.3.
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scribed by the statute or, if they can show good cause for continuance, within the
time allowed by the Court for such continuance." 66
D. Preclusive Effect "
There is one other topic which the legislature did not address which raises potential problems in applying the statute. That topic is the preclusive effect, which may
be accorded proceedings under the summary relief statute.6 8 Normally, the legislature
6 Criss, 319 S.E.2d at 408.
" Preclusion is used as a general term referring to the two ways in which one judgment will
have a binding effect on another:
The first is the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never have been litigated,
because of the determination that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit. The
second is the effect of foreclosing relitigation of matters that have once been litigated and
decided. The first of these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated, has gone under
the name, "true res judicata," or the names, "merger" and "bar." The second doctrine,
preclusion of matters that have once been decided, has usually been called "collateral estoppel." Professor Allen Vestal has long argued for use of the names "claim preclusion" and
"issue preclusion" for these two doctrines ...
C. WsuGoT, Tim LAW OF FEDEnRAL COURTS, 680 (4th ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted). The text focuses
on the problem of relitigation of matters once decided, referred to by the specific term, issue preclusion. The general term, preclusion, will be used only in its general sense. The terms, res judicala and
collateral estoppel, will not be employed.
" A sidelight here is the historical treatment of preclusion in the context of statutory proceedings
to recover possession of property. As noted earlier, the predecessor to statutory proceedings for possession was ejectment, which required proof by the plaintiff of title to the disputed land. The requirement
of title was expensive and time-consuming and allowed defendants with no lawful claim to the land
to prevail by showing a defect in the plaintiff's title. Ejectment came to be viewed as unsatisfactory
for landlord-tenant cases, and the statutory proceedings were created.
But the new proceedings could be fast and easy only if proof of title was not necessary. Thus,
it was held that title was not an issue in the statutory proceedings, which determined only the right
to possession. See, e.g., Hays v. Altizer, 24 W. Va. 505, 506 (1884).
This proscription was not sufficient to exclude issues of title from all cases, though, because defendants could assert title in themselves to show that their peaceable entry or detainer was lawful. See,
e.g., Moore v. Douglas, 14 W. Va. 708, 734 (1879). If these title determinations were given preclusive
effect in later actions, then the statutory proceedings would have been transformed into actions to
try title with all the attendant disadvantages. Apparently for that reason, the statutes usually provided
that the summary proceeding was not a bar to later actions between the parties nor determinative of
the facts or issues determined. To the contrary, the West Virginia unlawful detainer statute still provides that "[n]o such judgment [in unlawful detainer] shall bar any action of ejectment between the
same parties nor shall any such verdict be conclusive, in any such future action, of the facts therein
found...." W. VA. CODE § 55-3-5 (1981). In 1892 the West Virginia court concluded the following
about the nonpreclusive nature of the unlawful detainer statute:
English-speaking people have it ingrained into them that they ought not to be required to
lose or give up their land without having, if they see fit, two trials; hence the action of unlawful
entry, when not barred (three years) is frequently used as a preliminary skirmish to feel the
enemy, before final battle is brought on by an action of ejectment.
Hukill v. Guffey, 37 W. Va. 425, 445, 16 S.E. 544, 550 (1892).
The Hukill court plainly did not like the statutory exception to the normal rule of issue preclusion
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need not specify the preclusive effect, if any, of newly enacted rights, remedies,
or proceedings. In the present context, however, there is one unusual factor which
suggests consideration of the matter. In the statute, the legislature did not allow
landlords to obtain. judgments for past-due rent unless the tenant defaulted. 69
Section 55-3A-3(e) of the statute is the only section that sets out the provisions
of orders that courts may enter at the conclusion of summary proceedings. It provides that at the conclusion of contested hearings,7" if the tenant is found in wrongful
occupation, the court shall grant immediate possession to the petitioner. But in
the case of default hearings7 "the court may also make a written finding and include
in its order such relief on the issue of arrearage in the payment of rent as the evidence
may require.'" 2
The legislature appears quite consciously to have chosen this result. The differing language, the two separate sentences, and the use of the word also, make clear
that the legislature was aware of what it was doing. Speculation is all that can
be offered to illuminate the purpose of this legislative choice. An effect of this
choice is that the legislature encouraged the practice of settlement by return of
possession in exchange for waiver of back rent claims. Any lawyer who has handled
73
even a few landlord-tenant disputes knows that this form of settlement is common.
This legislative encouragement plays out on both sides of the dispute.
As the statute is written, the tenant who is in arrears in rent has the choice
and construed it strictly. The Hukill fact situation involved a dispute between competing lessees of
the same property, in which the first action was for unlawful detainer but the second was not an action
for ejectment. The court refused to apply the statutory exception, saying that the case was neither
within the letter of the statute, because the second action was not ejectment, nor within the spirit of
the statute, because it was a contest between lessees.
There do not appear to be any subsequent decisions by the court, dealing with the statutory exception
to the usual rule of issue preclusion and holding it applicable or inapplicable.
69 See infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutionality of the
default judgment procedure for past due rent set up by the statute.
70 The language specifically provides that "[alt the conclusion of a hearing held under the provisions of subsection (b) or (c) of this section. . . ." W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-3(e) (Supp. 1984). Subsection
(b) describes petitions alleging arrearage in rent in which the tenant defends by claiming breach by
the landlord of a material covenant. Id. § 55-3A-3(b). See supra note 41, discussing the meaning of
this subsection.
Subsection (c) describes petitions alleging breach by the tenant or damage to the property. W.
VA. CODE §
7' The

55-3A-3(c) (Supp. 1984).

language specifically states that "[i]n the case of a proceeding under subsection (a) of
this section .. ." W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-3(e) (Supp. 1984). Subsection (a) describes hearings "where
there has been no appearance, answer or other responsive pleading filed by the tenant ... " Id.
§ 55-3A-3(a).
Id. § 55-3A-3(e) (emphasis added).
' Even without specific agreement it is not unusual for tenants, upon being sued for possession
and back rent, to vacate the premises voluntarily. The landlord, having obtained the primary objective
of possession, often declines the further trouble or expense of pursuing the suit or attempting otherwise
to collect back rent from the departed tenant.
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of (1) answering the suit and admitting the arrearage, thereby returning possession
but having the assurance of no judgment for rent or (2) defaulting the suit, thus
requiring wasteful and unnecessary proceedings, and facing the penalty of judgment for rent in addition to return of possession. Plainly, the inducement is to
answer, admit, and thereby "settle."
The landlord whose tenant is in arrears has the choice of (1) filing a summary
relief petition, thereby gaining quick possession with the possibility of no judgment
for rent due or (2) filing an unlawful detainer complaint, which may take longer
but will provide assurance of a judgment for rent due. This trade-off presented
to the landlord-quick recovery of possession versus judgment for rent due-is
a necessary consequence of the inducement offered to the tenant.
If there were only one legal proceeding to recover possession, the legislature
politically and, perhaps, constitutionally could not restrict the landlord's right to
recover rent due. Because there now are two basic proceedings for recovery of
property,7" a choice is given to the landlord, and tenants are encouraged to settle.
But precisely because there are two proceedings with potentially differing remedies,
the preclusion issue arises. Posing the question as "issue preclusive, that is, what
effect will the first judgment have on the second suit, 75 leads to a dilemma, either
horn of which will defeat the proposed statutory scheme.
If there is no issue preclusive effect accorded the summary relief proceeding,
then the litigants face the possibility of multiple suits with inconsistent verdicts
on identical issues. This outcome, of course, is the classic reason for the development of the preclusion doctrine and would not encourage settlement by the parties.
If the issue preclusive effect is accorded the summary relief proceeding, then the
settlement inducement extended to the tenant is eliminated. The prevailing landlord
need only file the second suit, cite the judgment of the first (summary relief) suit,
and obtain a judgment for rent due. The statutory scheme is defeated.
The solution is to frame the question not as issue preclusive but as claim
preclusive.76 That is, the landlord's choice between unlawful detainer and summary
relief.must be a binding one, an election of remedies, so that choice of either type
of proceeding precludes the later assertion of the other. Only in this way can the
effect of the statute be carried out. The landlord's inducement is summary recovery
of possession; the tenant's inducement is waiver of 'back rent; the judicial policy
of finality is promoted; and the result is a fast, efficacious, and mutually beneficial
resolution of the dispute.

7" In their legal requirements, the magistrate court and the circuit court versions of unlawful
detainer are the same; only the time to answer is different. Ejectment is almost never used in residential
landlord-tenant disputes. Essentially, then, there are two proceedings: unlawful detainer and the sum-

mary relief petition.
7, See supra note 67.
76 Id.
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V.

PROBLEMS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION:

DUE PROCESS AND THE SuMMARY RELiEF STATUTE

A. Default Judgment Relief
In implementing this statutory inducement to settle notion the legislature
overlooked one aspect that both undercuts the statutory purpose and violates constitutional mandates of adequate notice. In a nutshell, the problem with the default
judgment for rent procedures is that the defendant is not required to be advised
that such a judgment would result upon default of a petition alleging rent arrearage.
In accord with the basic scheme, West Virginia Code section 55-3A-1(a) provides that a landlord may set forth in the petition only "[a] prayer for possession
of the property."1 77 Even if the ground for relief is rent arrearage, the prayer is
only for possession of the property. Nothing is required to be stated in the petition
about the consequences of default.
Furthermore, the notice that must be sent to the defendant must inform the
defendant only of the time and place of the hearing and of the time within which
to file any defense."8 There is no requirement anywhere in the statute that a tenant
be informed that a judgment for back rent can be entered if the tenant fails to
appear, answer, or otherwise plead.7
The first difficulty caused by this lack of notice of possible consequences is
that it undermines any effect the statute might have of encouraging resolution by
answer and admission, by hiding the inducement or by unfairly punishing those
who thought they were settling. If the "stick" of judgment for back rent is not
expressed, then the "carrot" of not having such a judgment may not be perceived.
If the inducement to answer and admit is not apparent, then it has no effect.
Alternatively, many tenants might understand the prayer for only possession
as an offer of settlement for waiver of back rent, which could be accepted merely
by vacating the premises and defaulting the suit. Only when they learn of the judgment for rent will they realize that the perceived terms of settlement were illusory.
They, unfairly, will receive the stick of a rent judgment when they thought they
" W. VA. CODE § 55-3A-l(a)(4) (Supp. 1984).
" Id. § 55-3A-I(c).

71Anticipating that the summary relief proceeding would be used frequently in magistrate courts,
the Administrative Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia promulgated
a one page form summary relief petition for use in the magistrate courts. On the face of the form
petition, under the heading Notice and Summons, the document states: "If you fail to appear or otherwise answer, judgment by default will be taken against you and you may be evicted from the premises.
... See reverse side for your rights."
The reverse side of the document contains three short paragraphs under the heading Defendant's
Rights. The last paragraph states in full: "If you neither file an answer nor appear at the hearing,
you may be evicted from the premises and a judgment for back rent owed, if any, may be entered
against you." This notice on the magistrate court form petition may be adequate to resolve the issue

discussed in the text. The basic point, however, is that the statute does not require such notice, and,
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were agreeing to the carrot of no such judgment. It is this unfairness which raises
a due process, lack of notice concern. Because the statute is designed to promote
resolution by mutual benefit, and such resolution will take place largely in the less
formal magistrate court system where lawyers often are not present, the lack of
notice of consequences is particularly inappropriate.
An argument can be made that the lack of notice is not unconstitutional because
of a distinction between the claim and the prayerfor relief. That is, the claim is
the allegation that the defendant has breached conditions of the landlord-tenant
agreement by rent arrearage, damage to the property, or breach of some other
covenant. When the defendant gets the petition with these allegations, she is apprised
of the claim against her and that is all that due process requires. The secondary
issue, of what relief is appropriate to the claim, falls outside the scope of the due
process requirement.
At least one case supports this argument, although in dictum. In Appleton
Electric Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc.,80 the defendant chose not to appear after
receiving service of the complaint. The plaintiff then proposed a default judgment
order awarding higher damages than pleaded in the complaint. The Seventh Circuit
characterized the defendant's objection as an argument "that it has a 'right' to
default, and to do so knowing the exact liability flowing from this default."" The
court rejected the defendant's position for other reasons but also stated in dictum
that "no known authority supports Graves' asserted proposition that defendants
have a 'right' to default and to know the exact measure of liability that will flow
82
from a prospective default."1
In the main, cases deciding whether a plaintiff can amend its damage clause
after default do support an analysis focusing upon the differences between the claim
asserted and the relief requested. Those cases do not turn upon constitutional considerations and allow such amendment only in the context of a defendant who
appeared initially but defaulted later by noncooperation with discovery or other
court order. 3
The argument favoring constitutionality of a default judgment for damages
not asserted in the complaint is unsupportable, however, in the context of the summary relief statute. First, it is incontestable that the policy supporting prior notice
SOAppleton
"
32

Id.
Id.

Electric Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1980).

at 610.
at 611.

$3 The following cases generally allowed a plaintiff to amend his damage clause after default in
order to prove or obtain higher damages than initially pleaded, noting two considerations: (1) the focus
of the analysis was that the change was in relief, not in the claim asserted and (2) the defendants had
appeared but defaulted by noncooperation with court orders. See, e.g., Growth Properties, Inc. v. Klingbeil
Holding Co., 419 F. Supp. 212 (D. Md. 1976); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51
(2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1971); Sarlie v. E.L. Bruce Co., 265 F. Supp.
371 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); and T.Y. Fong v. United States, 300 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1962).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/8
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of all items included in a default judgment is a policy basic to American law. It
is explicitly set forth in rule 54(c) of both the federal and the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure:
Demandfor judgment.-A judgment by default shall not be different in kind
from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except
as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment
is entitled,
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
4
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
Second, many of those cases which allow amendment of a damage claim after
default do so only in the context of defendants who have appeared in the litigation
but have defaulted for noncooperation or other causes.15 Some of those cases
recognize explicitly that the policy of the rule, and thus the result, is different for
default by nonappearance than for default by other cause. 6

1 W. VA. R. Crv. P. 54(c); FED. R. Cv. P. 54(c). The same notion also is expressed in rule
5(a) of both the West Virginia and the federal rules: "No service need be made on parties in default
for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them
shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4." W. VA. R
Civ. P. 5(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Insofar as the language of the new statute conflicts with the provi:
sions of these rules, the new statute may be argued to be an unconstitutional intrusion by the legislature
upon the exclusive power of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to promulgate rules. The
West Virginia Constitution provides as follows: "The court shall have power to promulgate rules for
all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process practice and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law." W. VA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3. Additionally, the separation of powers clause of the state constitution provides that
"[t]he legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall
exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the powers
of more than one of them at the same time... ." W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
The West Virginia court in recent years has been extremely jealous and protective of legislative
encroachments upon its powers. See State ex rel. Quelch v. Daugherty, 306 S.E.2d 233, 234 (1983)
and the numerous cases cited therein. Thus, the court could hold that the question of what relief may
be included in a default judgment is within its powers to regulate "writs, warrants, process practice
and procedure," that such power is exclusive, and that this portion of West Virginia Code § 55-3A-3(e)
therefore should be struck as an encroachment on its powers.
On the'other hand, the court has not resisted all legislative incursions into court powers. In State
ex rel. Frieson v. Isner, 285 S.E.2d 641 (W. Va. 1981), the court stated that where an intrusion by
the legislature is "minimal and inoffensive, and is consistent with and intended to be in aid of the
aims of the Court," the legislation may be upheld as being "in aid of the judicial power." Frieson,
285 S.E.2d at 654. Thus, the question might resolve to whether the relevant portion of § 55-3A-3(e)
was "in aid of the judicial power" or whether it was inconsistent and thus in derogation of the judicial
power.
1,All of the cases cited in supra note 79 fit this description. In the case cited in the text, Appleton
Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., the defendant defaulted by nonappearance but subsequenly was
served with a copy of the proposed default order which it could have contested. See Appleton, 635
F.2d at 607, 610.
86 See, e.g., Sarlie, 265 F. Supp. at 377 (stating that "[i]t is arguable, however, that as a matter
of policy the limitations of the Rule [54(c)] should apply only to a judgment by default for want of
appearance and not to a default judgment where the defendant has appeared" (footnote omitted)).
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Third, the commercial setting and the sophistication of the parties set the cited
cases entirely apart from the typical residential landlord-tenant case. The Hughes
Tool Company 87 may be presumed to know the consequences of nonappearance
or noncooperation, and fine distinctions between the claim and the relief requested
may prevail. For the typical tenant who may never before have been involved in
a lawsuit, such distinctions are not persuasive. Moreover, the fact is that the summary relief statute is used frequently and, perhaps, almost exclusively in the
magistrate court system, which is intended to be accessible to parties without the
benefit of counsel. This heightens the probability that the defendant will be unaware
of the effect of nonappearance.
Fourth, under the summary relief statute the availability of a judgment for
rent depends solely and entirely upon the conduct of the defendant. In other proceedings the relief available upon default is the same as that available after contested hearing, regardless of the defendant's presence or absence. But, under the
summary relief statute the plaintiff cannot obtain a judgment for rent unless the
defendant defaults.
Due process is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands. 8 Because the residential landlord-tenant relationship is recognized to be essentially a consumer transaction" and because this type
of case, the level of the court, and the speed of the process all combine to indicate
that the defendant will not be sufficiently advised of consequences that depend
solely upon his own actions, due process demands that clear and specific notice
be afforded the defendant. The summary relief statute does not require such notice
of the possible entry of a default judgment for rent due and thus would seem to
violate due process.
B.

Constitutionality as a Whole

After all the various aspects of the statute have been examined, there remains
one issue: the constitutionality of the fundamental notion of summary process.
The outlines of this discussion are set by the 1972 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Lindsey v. Normet,90 which upheld against a due process attack
an Oregon summary proceedings eviction statute.
In 1970, the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Act" provided three
grounds upon which the landlord could invoke summary proceedings: nonpayment
" See Hughes, 449 F.2d 51.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
'9 See Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d at 125.
" Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
" OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.105-160 (1983). This statute also is sometimes referred to as the "FED"
statute and still remains effective in Oregon. Shortly after the Lindsey decision, however, the FED
statute was affected and modified in substantial ways by Oregon's passage of a version of the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act in 1973. See id. §§ 91.700-.900.
"
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of rent, expiration of the term, or when the tenant was holding contrary to some
other covenant in the lease. 92 Service of the complaint was to be made "not less
than two or more than four days before" trial. 93 A continuance of up to two days
could be granted, or longer if the tenant paid a bond for the payment of any rent
that would accrue.94 At trial the only issue to be addressed was whether the allegations of the complaint were true. 95 The landlord was barred from asserting back
96
rent or other claims against the tenant.
The Supreme Court held that neither the early trial provision nor the limitation on litigable issues was facially invalid under the due process clause but left
room for a showing that the statute could be invalid as applied to a particular
tenant in a specific situation:
In those recurring cases where the tenant fails to pay rent or holds over after the
expiration of his tenancy and the issue in the ensuing litigation is simply whether
he has paid or held over, we cannot declare that the Oregon statue allows an unduly short time for trial preparation. Tenants would appear to have as much access
to relevant facts as their landlord, and they can be expected to know the terms
of their lease, whether they have paid their rent, whether they are in possession
of the premises, and whether they have received a proper notice to quit, if one
is necessary. .

.

. The provision for continuance of the action if the tenant posts

security for accruing rent means that in cases where tenant defendants . .. deny
nonpayment of rent and may require more time to prepare for litigation, they will
not be forced to trial if they provide for rent payments in the interim. .

.

. Of

course, it is possible for this provision to be applied so as to deprive a tenant of
a proper hearing in specific situations .... 97
Although the legal setting in West Virginia now is very different from that
of Oregon in 1970, the West Virginia court followed Lindsey in upholding the
92Id. § 105.115.
93Id. § 105.135.
94

Id. § 105.140.

95 Id. § 105.145. See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 63. Oregon landlord-tenant law of the time still held
to the doctrine of the independence of covenants between landlord and tenant. Thus, there was no
defense that could be raised on grounds of unsafe conditions, warranty of habitability, or the like.
In Lindsey, the Supreme Court held that due process strictures did not require that Oregon law
provide such defenses to the tenant. It is this holding for which Lindsey is most commonly cited:
Underlying appellants' claim is the assumption that they are denied due process of law unless
Oregon recognizes the failure of the landlord to maintain the premises as an operative defense
to the possessory FED action and as an adequate excuse for nonpayment of rent. The Constitution has not federalized the substantive law of landlord-tenant relations, however, and
we see nothing to forbid Oregon from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of
the landlord as independent rather than dependent covenants.
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 68.
The West Virginia court in 1978 abrogated the rule of independence of covenants and has provided that breach of a warranty of habitability may be asserted by a tenant as a defense. Teller, 253
S.E.2d 114.
96 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 46 & n. 10.
1, Id. at 64-65.
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constitutionality of the summary relief statute.98 Directly paraphrasing the above
quoted language from Lindsey, the court in the Criss decision stated:
In cases where the nonpayment of rent is the only issue in the proceeding we do
not believe that the time allowed for trial preparation is unduly short. Even if there
is an issue of fact regarding whether the rent was paid or whether the tenants had
a defense to the nonpayment, the tenant has as much access to the relevant facts
as his landlord.
In other cases like the one before us where the facts appear to be somewhat
more complex ... [the tenants] will not be forced to trial if they can show cause
that they need more time and they provide their rent payments in the interim.9

The tenants in the Criss case initially suggested to the court two factors 0' to
distinguish the West Virginia statute from the Oregon FED law upheld in Lindsey.
The first was the potential range of issues involved in the summary eviction. While
the grounds to invoke the two laws are similar, the only defense under the Oregon
law was to disprove the allegations of the complaint. There were no affirmative
defenses based upon a landlord's breach of any covenant upon which the duty
to pay rent depended.'' West Virginia, however, allows additional defenses based
upon breach by the landlord of the warranty of habitability'0 2 or upon retaliatory
conduct by the landlord."' Thus, the range of potential issues in West Virginia
is much broader and may involve many facts not equally accessible to both parties.

Criss, 319 S.E.2d 403.
Id. at 409.
110The tenants, petitioners in Criss, raised these points briefly in their petition for writ of prohibition. This argument was abandoned in the petitioners' subsequent brief, due to "intervening factual
developments." Petitioners' Reply Brief at 2, Criss, 319 S.E.2d 403.
The facts of the Crisscase indicate that the circuit court denied the petitioners' motion for continuance filed with their answer, counterclaim, and discovery requests. Thereafter, however, the circuit
court sua sponte continued the case for a total time of about one month. During that time the tenants
petitioned the supreme court for a writ of prohibition. While the request for the writ was still pending
and undecided, the circuit court held a trial spread over two days, and at the conclusion of the trial
the circuit court set a twenty-five day schedule for written agreement.
Approximately a week after the trial, the supreme court issued a rule in prohibition, staying all
further proceedings below "except such actions that would render this proceeding moot." Criss, 319
S.E.2d 403 (Feb. 1, 1984) (order issuing a rule in prohibition). After these factual developments, the tenants
did not pursue the argument that the statute as a whole was unconstitutional by unduly restricting
the opportunity to present a meaningful defense.
See OR. Ray. STAT. § 105.135 (1983).
See Teller, 253 S.E.2d 114.
sO3West Virginia Code § 55-3A-3(g) (Supp. 1984) specifically mentions cases in which there may
be an issue of retaliation. The Criss opinion stated that if the trial court were to attempt to deny the
tenants their retaliatory defense, "it would be misreading the statute and be in error." Criss, 319 S.E.2d
at 409. The Criss tenants alleged retaliation by the landlord for activities emanating "from the circumstances surrounding Mr. Criss' role as president of the Booth Towers Tenant's Association," Id.
at 405 n.3.
"
"
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The second distinguishing factor noted was that under the Oregon procedure
continuances apparently were not dependent upon a showing of cause but could
be obtained simply upon request and the filing of the necessary security. The West
Virginia procedure specifically excludes any continuance by right' 4 and conditions
a continuance upon a showing "for cause only."' 5 Thus, continuances were freely
available in Oregon but not under the West Virginia statute.
Both of these factors were of significance to the Lindsey decision. Simplicity
of the issues and ready availability of continuance were the only two considerations cited by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the time limitations
of the Oregon law.' 06 However, neither of these distinctions was discussed or even
noted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Instead, in Criss the court
simply quoted the continuance provision, cited Lindsey, and concluded that the
statute was not constitutionally defective.'0 There was no consideration of other

case law or of academic comment.' 0 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

The new summary relief statute stands as a model of poor drafting, leaving
or creating numerous problems to be addressed by the courts. Issues already clarified
by the courts provide that the parties are entitled to trial by jury and that the summary proceeding basically is within the structure and devices of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure. Exactly what accommodations will be necessary and

"04 In magistrate courts each party normally is entitled to one continuance of right without any
showing of cause. See W. VA. CoDE §§ 50-5-2, 55-3A-3(a) (1980 & Supp. 1984).
Id. § 55-3A-3(d).
"' Where the issue is whether the tenant has paid or held over, the tenant appears to have the
same access to relevant facts as the landlord. "The provision for continuance [upon posting security]

may require more time to prepare for litigation, they
means that ... where tenant defendants ...
will not be forced to trial. . . ." Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 64-65.

Criss, 319 S.E.2d at 409.
There appears to be only one other state which has considered whether its summary eviction
proceedings law is constitutional. In Jordan v. Duprel, 303 N.W.2d 796 (S.D. 1981), the lessor brought
a FED action on the theory that the lessee breached his lease by overgrazing. The South Dakota Supreme
Court like the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected the lessee's argument of unconstitutionality because of a four-day limitation on responsive pleading. The South Dakota Supreme Court
simply noted the similarity of the Oregon and the South Dakota statutes, pointed to the continuance
provision, cited Lindsey, and upheld the statute. Jordan, 303 N.W.2d at 800.
After Lindsey was decided, several commentators noted that the determination of constitutionality
should hinge on the defenses available to a tenant. Thus where, as in Lindsey, there are no defenses
other than denial of the complaint, the finding of constitutionality would be appropriate. On the other
hand, "[o]nce, however, defenses become available to the tenant, the procedural system needs reform.
In fact, change in the substantive law of landlord-tenant and change in the procedural law are inextricably intertwined." Note, Change in the American Law, supra note 57, at 245. See also Clocksin,
Alaska's Summary Eviction Law-A Confused Anachronism, 4 U.C.L.A. [UCLA]-AJAsKA L. REv.
56 (1974); Note, ForcibleEntry and Detainer Actions in Kansas: Some Observations on Lindsey v.
Normet, 21 KAN. L. REv. 71 (1972).
"'
"',
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appropriate between the time frames of the statute and the time frames of the Rules
remains to be worked out.
Similarly, exactly where this new proceeding fits into the existing legal structure and how judgments under the new statute will affect other proceedings remains
to be seen. Although perhaps not consciously envisioned by the legislature at passage,
the statute could have the effect of encouraging voluntary, negotiated settlements
of landlord-tenant possessory disputes if appropriately interpreted and applied by
the courts.
Finally, several serious questions defining the procedural rights of defendants
remain to be answered, apparently on a case-by-case basis: how much time is
guaranteed a defendant to answer, what prior notice a defendant should receive
of default judgment relief the entering of which is solely dependent upon the defendant's actions, and what circumstances would constitute a denial of the defendant's
right to a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."'0 9

309

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 389 U.S. 306 (1950).
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